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A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
THE LAW OF ASSOCIATION.
BEING, IN PART, A REVIEW OF PROFESSOR MAITLAND'S

LATEST WORK'.
When two or more persons are associated in the holding
of a right or in the pursuit of a common interest, the question at once arises whether they must act in concert in exercising the right or in pursuing the interest. If they must,
then a given act, if it is to be binding on all the associates,
depends for its validity upon the joinder of all in the doing
of it, or upon the delegation of the requisite authority to a
representative. If concurrence is not necessary, the alternative is that "the law may accept the action of those who can
be brought to concur in place of the action of all the associates, ignoring those who fail to act, or determining, where
all are willing to act, but disagree as to the course to be
pursued, which of the several contending parties or factions
shall prevail over the others."' In either case, when the act
Freund: "The Legal Nature of Corporations," Sec. 13. See this
and following sections for the development of the theory of "majority
control."
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is finally done, those not acting are represented by the actor.
Where the representation is by law an incident of a given
form of association Freund calls it "original representation."
When the authority of the actor rests upon express delegation the representation is styled "secondary."
The groups of which the law takes cognizance are many.
Associates are bound together by the ties of common right
or common interest with varying degrees of closeness.
Leaving out of consideration such loose forms of association
as societies formed for literary, scientific or religious purposes, we note the gradual tightening of the bond as we pass
from tenancy in common through joint tenancy to the
tenancy of a joint stock in partnership; then through tenancy of a joint stock in company form, until, finally, we
reach the extreme case of the collective holding of rights by
persons who are "incorporated" for business or other purposes or are knit together as citizens of a municipality, state
or nation. Joint tenancy and tenancy in common are relations which, in the typical case, are constituted without voluntary or conscious association. Persons standing in the
relation of co-tenants have not, as a rule, come together for
the sake of pursuing a common interest. Their primary
desire is usually for a division of their property and for their
satisfaction there has been developed the remedy of partition.
As representative action is foreign to their desires, it follows
that representation is not an incident of such tenancies. 2
Coming to the case of partnership, however, we recognize
the representative principle in the familiar rule that partners
are "agents of one another" within the scope of the business
of the firm. A partner's authority does not rest upon
express delegation. It is said to be "implied"; that is, it is
an incident of the relation.3 Beginning with partnership
and running through the closer forms of association we trace
'For example, one tenant cannot pass title to the common property
or make a valid lease of it. See McKinley v. Peters, iii Pa. 283 (i886).
Possibly the germ of representation is discernible in the doctrine that
delivery of a deed to one of several vendees is delivery to all. Payne
v. Echols, 15 Atl. 895 (1888).
See also Holt's Appeal, 98 Pa. 257

(i88).
'See, for example, Burdick on Partn., p. 159.
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the development of this representative principle. In partnership, one associate may act for the group; but if all
choose to join in the act, the act is legally valid. In the
case of a joint stock company or other statutory association
it is sometimes left optional with the associates to retain
the acting-right for the whole group or to vest it exclusively
in representatives. 4 In the event of incorporation, the acting-right is, as an incident of the relation, exercisable only
by the duly elected representatives of the members. Hence
a deed or mortgage of corporate property in which all the
members join is void. 5 When people become incorporated
they subject themselves to a form of organization which has
definite legal incidents. Common rights must be dealt with
in the common name and by the regular representatives.
This principle holds even when all the stock is assembled in
the hands of a single holder. 6 So strenuous is the insistence on compliance with the formalities of organization that
all the stockholders in meeting assembled cannot validly
appoint any other agent than the directors to do an act which,
by custom, falls within the scope of their representative
powers. 7 In the municipal corporation, the state or the
United States, the operation of the principle is so familiar
as almost to escape observation. The citizens resident in a
certain geographical area, invested with the privileges and
responsibilities of local self-government, might conceivably
enact their legislation at a meeting at which every voter
is present. But such a meeting could probably never
'An illustration is furnished by the Pennsylvania statute of 1899,

May 9; P. L. 261. Section 4 is (in part) as follows: "The partners
may provide [by by-law] that certgin only of the members shall have
active charge of the business and be authorized to enter into contracts,
undertakings or engagements whereby the partnership shall be held
liable and may change the same as they see fit."
'Bundy v. Iron Co., 38 Ohio St. 300 (1882). In this case the court,
while treating the mortgage as void at law, gave effect to it as an
equitable mortgage.

Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn.

252.

' See the language of Vice-Chancellor Pitney in Loewenthal v. Rubber
Also the language of ViceChancellor Green in Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Buck, 52 N. J.

Reclaiming Co., 52 N. J. Eq. 445 (1894).
Eq. 219 (1893).
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assemble. A more practical rule is that which gives validity
to the acts of those who attend as representatives of the
whole group.8 In large communities even this rule would
prove unsatisfactory. Hence the situation with which we
are most familiar, i. e., the enactment of legislation by
chosen representatives sitting in council, in legislature or in
Congress. Occasionally the people feel the .necessity for
direct and immediate action otherwise than through representatives. At such times a plebiscite is taken or a "town
meeting" is called. Such a gathering is significant if the
people assemble spontaneously and under a powerful common impulse. Often, however, it is a gathering mechanically contrived by a handful of irate citizens or by a group
of practical politicians.
When a representative system is fully developed, as in
the case of incorporation, an opportunity is afforded for the
explanation of its phenomena by conceiving of a "legal person" (distinct from the members of the group) as being the
principal for whom the representatives act. The "United
States," the "State of New York," the "City of Philadelphia" are said to act when the legislative bodies at Washington, Albany or Harrisburg pass laws. "The Standard Oil
Company" is said to fix prices whenever the representatives
of the stockholders associated under that name determine
upon a scale of rates. "The corporation" is said to own
property when the situation is that the associated owners
can pass title only by a deed executed by a representative
in the common name. "The corporation" is said to make
a contract-to owe a debt-to hold a chose-in-action-to
commit a tort-when the situation is that common action is
legally possible only when the appropriate machinery is set
in motion to enable the associates to perfect an obligation,
to collect a debt that is due to them; or to enable their creditor to reach that common fund which alone is liable for his
satisfaction.
Some minds accept as satisfactory a concepion of the
corporate person which ascribes to such person no real existence. The corporate person is only persona ficta. Chief Jus' Such is the case with the New England town.
Corp., Sec. 270 et passhn.

See Dillon Munic.
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tice Marshall's celebrated definition9 accurately expresses the

idea with which English-speaking lawyers have been operating for centuries whenever they have been called upon to
develop corporation law. To some minds, on the other
hand, the invocation of a fiction seems altogether objectionable, for the reason that to invoke a fiction is not to explain
a legal difficulty: it is merely to adopt a device to cover up
the difficulty and discourage all attempts at legal analysis.
The fiction becomes, as it were, a local anaesthetic. It works
no cure, but deadens the pain. Unfortunately, however, it
is used not to render a mental operation possible, but to serve
as a substitute for one. No substitute could be more inadequate. Its inadequacy is coming to be generally recognized
wherever lawyers take time to consider the efficiency of the
tools with which they are called upon to work. In Germany
and in France the persona ficta has been weighed and found

wanting. 10 In American courts results are constantly
reached which are not in harmony with the fiction theory."'
12
There are, now and then, grumblings at the theory itself.
Association is a permanent economic force. Corporations
and companies of various sorts have come to stay. The
importance of these groups gives a corresponding importance
to the law which governs persons associated in such relations.
The twentieth century will be, without doubt, a century during which English law will be subjected to a closer analysis
than ever before. The common law must "pass through the
schools." This means that a sound theory on which to Work
out corporation problems is indispensable. Nothing can be
more timely, therefore, than a work which will serve as a
"A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers,
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence." Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 517 (I8I9).
"If such an expression can be used respecting that which is by supposition imponderable.
" See, for example, Port of Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289 (1886);
Gibb's Estate, 157 Pa. 59 (1893) ; Moore, etc., Hardware Co. v. Towers,
etc., Co., 87 Ala. 2o6 (1888) ; Shelmerdine v. Welsh, 47 L. I. 26 (189o);
Mobile, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nicholas, 12 S. R. 723 (1893).
12 Morawetz, Priv. Corp., Sec. 227.
See State v. Standard Oil Co., 40

Ohio St. 137 (1892).
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stimulus to clear thinking on the subject and an incentive to
further research.
Such a work is Professor Maitland's translation of a portion of Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht by Dr. Otto
Gierke, of the University of Berlin.3 Of equal importance
with the text and possessing a livelier interest for all American students of corporation law is the translator's Introduction. In it Professor Maitland (after explaining the scope of
Dr. Gierke's work) sketches briefly, and in his singularly
attractive style, the history of the law in Germany since the
"Reception.' 4 He tells of the deluge of Italian doctrine
which swept over Germany and submerged German law. "In
theory what was received was the law of Justinian's books.
In practice what was received- was the system which the
Italian commentators had long been elaborating." "Englishmen," says Professor Maitland (and the same remark
is applicable to Americans) "are wont to fancy that the law
of Germany must needs savour of the school, the lecture
room, the professor; but in truth it was just because German
law savoured of nothing of the kind, but rather of the open
air, oral tradition and thoroughly unacademic doomsmen
that the law of Germany ceased to be German and that German law has had to be disinterred by modern professors."
Dr. Gierke is one of those who is aiding to disinter it and he
is a champion of that Germanist school which is waging a
winning warfare against the Romanist school, whose theory
of corporation law rests upon the persona ficta. 5 With the
persona ficta Dr. Gierke has no patience. Perhaps it would
""Political Theories of the Middle Age," by Dr. Otto Gierke, Professor of Law in the University of Berlin. Translated, with an Introduction, by Frederic William Maitland, LL. D., D. C. L. Downing Professor of the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge. Cambridge: at the University Press; igoo. The portion which Professor
Maitland has selected for translation is a section of the third volume
of Dr. Gierke's work.
24.
e., of Roman Law. "Very often Renaissance, Reformation and
Reception will be set before us as three intimately connected and almost
equally important movements which sever modern from medieval history."
' "According to Dr. Gierke, the first man who used this famous phrase
was Sinibald Fieschi, who in 1243 became Pope Innocent IV. More
than one generation of investigators had passed away, indeed that
whole school of glossators was passing away, before the Roman texts
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be better to say that with infinite patience he has conducted
his researches and developed his argument until he has displaced the fiction. We are reminded that the fiction theory
leads naturally to the "concession theory"-the theo-y that
the corporation is and must be the creature of the state.
When the doctrine was once established that corporate rights
were obtainable only by concession from the prince, the
prince was enabled to keep the corporation "safe under lock
and key." 1 6 English lawyers received the concession theory
from the Canonists.17 In America it has been loudly prowould yield a theory to men who lived in a Germanic environment, and,
when a theory was found, it was found by the canonists, who had
before their eyes as the typical corporation, no medieval city, village
or gild, but a collegiate or cathedial church. In Dr. Gierke's view Innocent, the father of 'the Fiction Theory,' appears as a truly great lawyer.
He really understood the texts; the head of an absolute monarchy, such
as the Catholic Church was tending to become, was the very man to
understand them; he found the phrase, the thought, for which others
had sought in vain. The corporation is a person; but it is a person
by fiction and only by fiction. Thenceforward this was the doctrine professed alike by legists and canonists, but, so our author contends, it never
completely subdued some inconsistent thoughts of Germanic origin
which found utterance in practical conclusions. In particular, to mention one rule which is a good touchstone for theories. Innocent, being
in earnest about the mere fictitiousness of the corporation's personality, and having -good warrant in the Digest, proclaimed that
the corporation could commit neither sin nor delict. As Pope he might
settle the question of sin, and at all events could prohibit the excommunication of an uw;ivcrsitas, but as a lawyer he could not convince his
fellow-lawyers that corporations must never be charged with crime or
tort." P. xix.
""One outspoken Legist reckoned as the fifty-ninth of the sixtyseven prerogatives of the Emperor that he, and only he, makes fictions:
'Solus princeps fingit quod in rei veritate non est."' P. xxx.
"7"Blackstone could even boast that the law of England went beyond
'the civil law' in its strict adhesion to this theory." Commen. I, 472.
"Lawyers could even say that the common law reckoned it a crime for
men 'to presume to act as a corporation.'" Professor Maitland points
out that the inconvenience of such a theory was not felt in England
because English lawyers might say, "Allow us our trusts, and the law
and theory of corporations may indeed be important, but it will not
prevent us from forming and maintaining permanent groups of the
most various kinds; groups that, behind a screen of trustees, will live
happily enough, even from century to century, glorying in their unincorporatedness. If Pope Innocent and Roman forces guard the front
stairs we shall walk up the back."
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claimed. "Ignorant men on board the Mayflower may have
thought that, in the presence of God and of one another, they
could covenant and combine themselves together into 'a
civil body politic.' Their descendants know better. A
classical definition has taught that 'a corporation is a franchise,' and a franchise is a portion of the state's power in the
hands of a subject. A sovereign people has loved to deck
itself in the purple of the Byzantine Basileus and the triple
crown of the Roman pontiff. 18s "In Germany," we read in
another place, "the concession theory has fallen from its high
estate; the Romanists are deserting it; it is yielding before
the influence of laws similar to, though less splendidly courageous than our Act of 1862, that 'Magna Carta of co-operative enterprise,' which placed corporate form and legal personality within easy reach of 'any seven or more persons
associated for any lawful purpose.' It has become difficult
to maintain that the state makes corporations in any other
sense than that in which the state makes marriages, when it
declares that people who want to marry can do so by going,
and cannot do so without going, to church or registry. The
age of corporations created by way of 'privilege' is passing
away. The constitutions of some American states prohibit
the legislatures from calling corporations into being except
by means of general laws, and among ourselves the name
'chartered' has nowadays a highly specific sense. What is
more, many foreign lawyers are coming .to the conclusion
that in these days of free association, if a group behaves as
a corporation, the courts are well-nigh compelled to treat it
as such, at least in retrospect. It has purposely, let us say,
or negligently, -omitted the act of registration by which it
would have obtained an unquestionable legal personality.
Meanwhile it has been doing business in the guise of a corporation, and others have done business with it under the
belief that it was what it seemed to be. It is strongly urged
that in such cases injustice will be done unless corporateness
is treated as matter of fact, and American courts have
made large strides in this direction. It seems seriously questionable whether a permanently organized group, for example a trade union, which has property held for it by trustees,
sP. xxxi.
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should be suffered to escape liability for what would generally be called 'its' unlawful acts and commands by the teclhnical plea that 'it' has no existence 'in the eye of the law.'
Spectacles are to be had in Germany which, so it is said,
enable the law to see personality wherever there is bodiliness,
and a time seems at hand when the idea of 'particular creation' will be as antiquated in corporation law as it is in zoology. Whether we like it or no, the concession theory has notice to quit, and may carry the whole fiction theory with it.""'
If one rejects the fiction theory, it by no means follows,
however, that he must banish the "corporate person" from
the realm of law: On the contrary (if he takes Dr. Gierke
as his master) he will solve all the problems of corporation
law upon the theory that where persons are associated in "fellowship" groups the group itself is a person distinct from
the associates. "No fiction, no symbol," says Professor
Maitland; "no piece of the state's machinery, no collective
name for individuals, but a living organism and a real per-"-"
son, with body and members and a will of its own. Itself
can will, itself can act; it wills and acts by the men who are
its organs as a man wills and acts by brain, mouth and hand.
It is not a fictitious person; it is a Gesammitperson and its
will is a Gesammtwille; it is a group-person and its will is
a group-will." 20 Such is the organic theory of the corporate
person which affords -to the German Realist a satisfaction
which the fiction theory fails to yield him. "The Realist's
cause," Professor Maitland observes, "would be described
by those who are forwarding it as an endeavor to give
scientific precision and legal operation to thoughts which are
in all modern minds and which are always displaying themselves, especially in the political field. We might be told to
read the leading article in to-day's paper and observe the
ideas with which the writer 'operates': the will of the nation,
the mind of the legislature, the settled policy of one state,
the ambitious designs of another: the praise and blame that
are awarded to group-units of all sorts and kinds. We might
."
P. xxxvii. For a consideration of the legal incidents of irregular
incorporation the reader may be referred to 36 Am. Law Reg. and
Rev. (N. S.)

" P. xxvi.

ioo, 161.
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be asked to count the lines that our journalist can write
without talking of organization. We might be asked to
look at our age's criticism of the political theories and political projects of its immediate predecessor and to
weigh those charges of abstract individualism, atomism
and macadamization that are currently made. We might
be asked whether the British Empire has not yet revolted
against a sovereign that was merely many (a sovereign number, as Austin said) and in no sense really one,
and whether 'the people' that sues and prosecutes in American courts is a collective name for some living men and a
name whose meaning changes at every minute. We might
be referred to modern philosophers: to the social tissue of
one and the general will, which is the real will, of another.
Then, perhaps, we might fairly be charged with entertaining
a deep suspicion that all this is metaphor, apt, perhaps, and
useful, but essentially like the personification of the ocean
and the ship, the storm and the stormy petrel. But we, the
Realist would say, mean business with our group-person
and severe legal logic. We take him into the law courts
and markets and say that he stands the wear and tear of forensic and commercial life. If we see him as the state, in
an exalted sphere where his form might be mistaken for a
cloud of rhetoric or mysticism, we see him also in humble
quarters, and there we can apprehend and examine and even
vivisect him. For example, we are obliged to ask precise
questions concerning the inferior limit of group-life. Where
does it disappear? That is no easy question, for the German
partnership goes near to disengaging a group-will from the
.several wills of the several partners; but, on the whole, we
hold, and can give detailed reasons for holding, that in this
quarter the line falls between our partnership and our jointstock company."
22
In an essay, to which reference has already been made.
Professor Freund, of the University of Chicago, stated Dr.
Gierke's theory in 1897, and also noted some cogent objec"-"The Legal Nature of Corporations." Sec. 29. Of this essay Professor Maitland says that it contains the only English statement of the
Organic Theory which he has seen.

STUDY OF THE LAW OF ASSOCIATION.

tions to it.2 3 He pointed out that it is quite possible to
admit the distinctive individuality of collective bodies under
certain circumstances without accepting it as the solution of
the problem of corporate rights. An aggregate will may be
distinguished (as in the case of a deliberative body or a
mob) where persons are subject to a close physical connection or to a constancy of common impressions. "But the
collective holding of rights is not dependent upon associations of such strongly-marked cohesion.
A family with strong elements of cohesion is without corporate will, while a stock company without any noticeable
psychological connection between the members may easily
exercise common rights."2 4 Indeed, the question asked by
Professor Maitland, in the extract last quoted from his
Introduction with respect to the disappearance of the groupperson, seems to touch the German theory in a vital part.
The line is drawn between the joint stock company and the
partnership. In the former case there is, in the latter case
there is not, a group-person. This is, possibly, a necessary
conclusion if the theory is to be adhered to; but the theory is
not thereby recommended as a basis of legal development.
Where the economic interests of the associates are so closely
allied, as is the case in partnerships, joint stock companies
and corporations, any legal theory which compels us to relegate these groups to different categories loses much in comparison with a theory which enables us to treat them all as
instances of the progressive development of a single principle. The problem with which the law is confronted is an
economic problem and legal science and economic science
should work harmoniously in the solution of it. Economic
science recognizes that much depends upon emphasizing the
individuality of each member of corporate and other groups
in order to determine with nicety the extent to which the
interests of the several members are in harmony and the
Sec. 30.

' Id. He adds: "The people of the United States have perhaps the
ihdividuality of a nation, they certainly have it to a much more marked
degree than the people of the State of New York, but as to their holding
of rights both stand exactly alike, while neither New Englanders nor
Southerners as such can be parties to any legal relation."
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extent to which they are in conflict. Economics, accordingly, never for a moment forgets that the unit in the problem continues to be the individual, although it is true that he
must now be studied in the relation which he has assumed
towards other individuals.
So, also, ethical science detects the individual in the group,
and denies to him the right to escape from his personal
accountability for his acts by endeavoring to lose himself
amid the crowd of his associates. If the business is carried
on upon lines which run athwart the moral law, each of the
associates is answerable in the forum of conscience, whether
he takes an active part in the management or suffers himself
to be represented by unworthy agents. It will not do for A
to plead that the wrong was done by the "group." The
answer of ethics is that the group is nothing but the aggregate of A and his responsible associates.
Political science, likewise (if a group happens to be one
which comes within its ken) refuses to lose sight of the
individual. Ethics pursues the individual to make sure that
he does not escape his responsibilities.
Political science
seeks out the individual that he may not be deprived of his
rights. Just as the government is from the people and by
the people so also it is for the people. It is the people as a
group of individuals who own the public land. It is the
people to whom the holders of office are accountable. It is
the people who sue to redress public wrongs. It is the people
who act when laws are made, notwithstanding that an
orderly system requires that they should act through representatives.
Not only may it be objected that the theory of the groupperson tends to prevent the attainment of harmony between
law and related sciences, but there is room for doubt
whether (even in the field of law) it affords a satisfactory
basis for adjusting the rights of associates inter se. If
it were to be conceded that the group, when acting as a
whole, is an organic person, there would still remain for
determination the respective rights of majorities and minorities of associates within the group, the relation of the groupto the single associate and the relation of the single associate to the common creditor. It is easy to see the advan-
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tages of a theory which recognizes the individual associates
as co-owners of property who have conflicting interests
requiring adjustment or harmonious interests to which
effect must be given; of a theory which identifies the associate as a debtor responsible for the common debt within the
limits of a restricted liability; of a theory which regards
the associate as the principal for whom the directors act.
Such a theory makes a "trust fund doctrine" unnecessary and
a law of ultra vires impossible. It affords a basis for the
solution of problems affecting voting rights, the distribution
of dividends and the transfer of corporate shares. These
advantages are possessed by the representative theory as outlined at the beginning of this paper. To the extent, however,
that the organic theory leads to the same result, it does so
only by assuming the existence between the associates of an
organic relation analogous to the relation between the brain
and heart and hand of man. From the assumption of the
existence of a group-person follows the reconstruction of his
body in a fashion which is perilously near the domain of
fancy. Professing to discard fiction, it may be questioned
whether the theory does not involve the most audacious of
all fictions-the assertion that fiction is reality.
The student must, then, make his choice between a legal
development in which a part is played by a person distinct
from the species to which the student himself belongs and a
development in which men are the only actors. If he gives
his allegiance to the "legal person," he must decide whether
he owes it to a personaficta or to a being with real existence.
If he repudiates both doctrines of the legal person he must
solve all the problems in the law of association by referring
rights and liabilities to the individual associates, always giving full scope to the operation of the representative principle.
It is clear that Professor Maitland can no longer be numbered among the followers of the fictional "entity." Is he
prepared to acknowledge the sway of the Gesammtperson?
His Introduction leaves us in doubt. However this may be,
he surely can be claimed as the most powerful of all allies
by those who contend that the corporation must be studied
in its relation to partnerships, to guilds, to tenancies (joint
and in common), to municipalities, to trusts; in fact, to
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every kind of association which men are led to form by those
economic impulses which are our springs of action. That he
has grasped this fundamental and all-important conception
sufficiently appears from the following interesting passage:
"Let us try to imagine-we are not likely to see-a book
with some such title as English Fellowship Law, which in
the first place described the structure of the groups in which
men of English race have stood from the days when the
revengeful kindred was pursuing the blood feud to the days
when the one-man-company is issuing debentures, when
parliamentary assemblies stand three deep above Canadian
and Australian soil and 'Trusts and Corporations' is the
name of a question that vexes the great Republic of the West.
Within these bounds lie churches, and even the medieval
church, one and catholic; religious houses; mendicant
orders; non-conforming bodies; a Presbyterian system; universities, old and new; the village community, which Germanists revealed to us; the manor, in its growth and decay;
the township; the New England town; the counties and hundreds; the chartered boroughs; the guild, in all its manifold
varieties; the inns of court; the merchant adventurers; the
militant 'companies' of English condottieri, who, returning
home, help to make the word 'company' popular among us;
the trading companies; the companies that become colonies;
the companies that make war; the friendly societies; the
trade unions; the clubs; the group that meets at Lloyd's
Coffee-house; the group that becomes the Stock Exchange;
and so on, even to the one-man-company, the Standard Oil
Trust and the South Australian statutes for communistic
villages. The English historian would have a wealth of
group-life to survey, richer even than that which has come
under Dr. Gierke's eye, though he would not have to tell of
the peculiarly interesting civic group, which hardly knows
whether it is a municipal corporation or a sovereign republic. And then we imagine our historian turning to inquire
how Englishmen have conceived their groups: by what
thoughts they have striven to distinguish and to reconcile
the manyness of the members and the oneness of the body.
The borough of the later middle ages he might well regard
with Dr. Gierke as a central node in the long story. Into it
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and out from it run most of the great threads of develop-

ment, economic and theoretical. The borough stretches one
hand back to the village community and the other forward to
freely formed companies of all sorts and kinds. And this
Dr. Gierke sets before us as the point at which the unity of
the group is first abstracted by thought and law from the
plurality, so that 'the borough' can stand out in contrast to
the sum of existing burgesses as another person, but still as
a person in whom they are organized and embodied." 25
George Wharton Pepper.

, P. xxvi.

